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Abstract 
An increase in life expectancy brings about an aging society, necessitating increasing 
demand for elderly care services. This paper presents an examination of how an aging 
society affects the demand for elderly care services and the labor market for elderly care 
services. Related reports of the literature describe that an aging society raises the share 
of labor dedicated to elderly care services. However, considering a closed economy in 
which saving affects the capital stock, an aging society does not always raise the share 
of labor allocated for elderly care services as derived by the related literature. This paper 
presents an examination of how the labor share and wage inequality between the final 
goods sector and elderly care sector are determined. In addition, this paper presents an 
examination of whether the subsidy for elderly care service increases demand for elderly 
care services, or not.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an examination of how an aging society affects the elderly care 
services sector. In some OECD countries, including Japan and Germany, elderly care 
services are provided through long-term care insurance. Many reports of the related 
literature describe long-term care insurance that can be used if individuals need elderly 
care services. Pauly (1990) and Miyazawa, Moudoukoutas and Yagi (2000) have 
demonstrated that long-term care insurance should be managed by the government, not 
by private insurance, because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Because 
of long-term insurance, individuals might fail to make an effort to improve or maintain 
their health status. Thereby, inefficiencies arise. Some studies have examined optimal 
subsidies for elderly care and optimal long-term care insurance. Subsidies for elderly 
care services decrease the costs of using the long-term care insurance, but taxation is 
expected to be necessary to finance the subsidy. Income taxation decreases household 
disposable income. Then savings decrease. Consequently, capital accumulation is 
prevented, which slows income growth. Considering these positive and negative effects 
of subsidies, Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998), Tabata (2005), and Mizushima (2009) derive 
optimal subsidies for long-term care. Cremer and Pestiau (2014) examine public 
subsidies for elderly care services as a redistribution policy. 
Long-term care of two types exists: formal care and informal care. Formal care is 
provided by the market service: if individuals need elderly care, they buy elderly care 
services from the market. However, the children provide elderly care with their time. 
They must reduce the labor supply time because of the time necessary for informal care. 
This point is examined by Byrne, Goeree, Hiedemann and Stern (2009), Courbage and 
Zweifiel (2011), Korn and Wrede (2013), and Mou and Winer (2015). Younger people must 
remain dedicated to informal elderly care. Therefore, they cannot obtain sufficient 
income to survive. They therefore descend into poverty. 
In an aging society, the labor supply of the elderly care services sector increases with 
the progress of aging. This result is explained by Hashimoto and Tabata (2010). Both the 
ratio of older people among the population and the labor supplied to the elderly care 
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services sector increase are presented in Fig. 1. However, a problem exists by which the 
wage rate of the elderly care services sector is lower than that of other industries, as 
presented in Fig. 2. These data are consistent with those presented by Cremer and 
Pestieau (2012) who explain that elderly care services will necessarily increase in OECD 
countries. 
 
 [Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.] 
 
Aisa and Pueyo (2013) derive that an aging society can decrease the labor supplied to 
the elderly care services sector. An aging society has higher levels of household savings 
because households require savings for consumption. An increase in savings raises the 
capital stock and the labor productivity, which then increases the wage rate of the sector 
that uses the capital stock as an input. Some papers examine the effect of an aging 
society on the labor supplied to elderly care service sector in both small open and closed 
economies. 
In contrast to those earlier efforts, this paper presents derivation of how an aging 
society affects the wage inequality between the final goods sector and elderly care sector. 
Neither Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) nor Aisa and Pueyo (2013) examine wage 
inequality. As presented in Fig. 2, this wage inequality is a problem by which workers in 
elderly care services work at low wages, which brings about a shortage of labor in the 
elderly care services sector. To consider wage inequality and labor mobility, this paper 
uses a model based on Caselli (1999), which considers the training cost necessary to work 
in a high-skill sector. By considering the training cost for labor mobility, wage inequality 
can be examined. 
Results obtained through these analyses are presented as follows. An increase in life 
expectancy decreases the labor supply for the elderly care services sector. By considering 
not the small open economy but the closed economy, an aging society does not always 
increase its supply of labor for the elderly care services sector. Wage inequality between 
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the final goods sector and the elderly care sector is diminished by an increase in life 
expectancy. 
Moreover, this paper presents an examination of how the subsidy for elderly care 
service affects the labor share of elderly care services and wage inequality. Canta, 
Pestiau and Thibault (2016) describe consideration of how elderly care services affect 
capital accumulation via financing of subsidies for elderly care services. However, they 
do not examine wage inequality. The present paper has some new points and 
consideration of the importance of incorporating wage inequality. 
Considering the results presented in this paper, an aging society reduces the elderly 
care sector workers and raises the wage rate of the elderly care sector as a pure effect. 
However, the subsidy for elderly care service raises the elderly care sector worker wages. 
Wage inequality between two sectors shrinks as shown by the results presented herein. 
The results are consistent with real data, as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
The remainder of this paper consists of the following. Section 2 explains the model. 
Section 3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 presents an examination of the effects of an 
aging society. Section 5 reports effects of subsidies on elderly care services. Section 6 
examines the effect of an aging society and the subsidy for elderly care service on the 
labor market with numerical examples. The final section concludes this paper. 
 
 2. Model 
There exist agents of three types: households, firms, and a government. 
 
 2.1 Household 
This paper assumes that individuals in households exist in two periods: young and old. 
In each period, younger people and older people live simultaneously. This paper presents 
consideration of a two-period overlapping generations model assuming no population 
growth and assuming population size as unity over time. These analyses also assume a 
survival rate: some younger people cannot live to the old period. 
Individuals obtain utility from consumption in young and old periods, and from 
elderly care services for themselves in old periods. The utility function ݑ௧ is assumed as 
5 
 
ݑ௧ ൌ ߙ݈݊ܿଵ௧ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ݈݊ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ݈݊݁௧ାଵ, 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1, 0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1. (1) 
where ܿଵ௧ and ܿଶ௧ାଵ respectively denote consumption during young and old periods.1 
݁௧ାଵ denotes the demand for elderly care services. ݌ denotes the survival rate and the 
share of ݌ at the younger people in t period can live in the old period. The range of ݌ is 
assumed as 0 ൏ ݌ ൏ 1. 
During the young period, younger people work inelastically and obtain the wage 
income. Wage income is allocated into the consumption during the young period and 
savings for consumption during the old period. Then, the budget constraints in young 
and old periods are shown as 
ݓഥ௧ ൌ ܿଵ௧ ൅ ݏ௧, (2) 
ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൌ ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ݖ௧ାଵ݁௧ାଵ, (3) 
where ݓഥ௧  and ݏ௧  respectively denote the wage rate and saving. In addition, ܴ௧ାଵ 
denotes the interest rate of annuity. The 1 െ ݌ share of younger people cannot live to 
the old period. The savings and interest that the 1 െ ݌  share of people had are 
distributed equally for the share ݌ of people. The interest rate at that time is given as 
ܴ௧ାଵ. ݖ௧ାଵ denotes the price of elderly care services. 
Allocations to maximize the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) 
and (3) are reduced to the following.2 
ܿଵ௧ ൌ ߙߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻݓഥ௧, (4) 
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ݌
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ݓഥ௧, (5) 
݁ଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݖ௧ାଵ
݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ݓഥ௧. (6) 
2.2 Firms 
                                                  
1 Even if the heterogeneous household is assumed to consider heterogeneous demand for elderly care 
services, the amount presented in the paper is not changed because the heterogeneous demand for 
elderly care does not play a role in changing the result. 
2 Data show that the labor participation of elderly people rises in an aging society in developed 
countries such as Japan. On the other hand, this paper does not consider the labor participation of 
elderly people. However, even if the paper considers the labor participation of elderly people, the results 
presented herein do not change because eq. (30) always holds irrespective of the labor supply. (Data: 
Statistics Japan) 
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This model economy has firms of two types, respectively serving the final goods sector 
and elderly care sector. The production function in the final goods sector is assumed as 
௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఏܮ௧ଵିఏ, 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, (7) 
where ܭ௧ and ܮ௧ respectively denote capital stock and labor input. Also, ௧ܻ denotes the 
final goods. Final goods are used as consumption goods and investment goods. With 
perfect competition, the wage rate in the final goods sector and interest rate are shown 
as 
ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܭ௧ఏܮ௧ି ఏ, (8) 
1 ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ߠܭ௧ఏିଵܮ௧ଵିఏ. (9) 
ܴ௧ is given as ܴ௧ ൌ ଵା௥೟௣ . If younger people want to work in the final goods sector, then 
they must pay the training cost ߪ௧. ߪ௧	is assumed to distribute uniformly between ൣ0, 	ߪത൧. 
Then, younger people can obtain the net wage rate as ݓ௧ െ ߪ௧.3 
In this model economy, there exists an elderly care sector as another sector. The 
production function in the elderly care sector is assumed as 
௧ܻ௖ ൌ ߩܮ௧௖, 0 ൏ ߩ, (10)
where ܮ௧௖ denotes labor supply for elderly care. Considering profit function ߨ௧ as	ߨ௧ ൌ
ݖ௧ߩܮ௧௖ െ ݓ௧௖ܮ௧௖, the wage rate in elderly care sector in the case of perfect competition is the 
following. 
ݓ௧௖ ൌ ݖ௧ߩ, (11)
 
3. Equilibrium 
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium. Considering the equilibrium, 
occupational choice should be considered. An individual in a household has training cost 
ߪ௧ to work in the final goods sector. Then, the following three types of work are shown. 
ݓ௧௖ ൐ ݓ௧ െ ߪ௧, Working in the elderly care sector (12a) 
ݓ௧௖ ൏ ݓ௧ െ ߪ௧, Working in the final goods sector (12b) 
                                                  
3 This setting is the same as that described by Caselli (1999), who considers the effect of the change on 
the labor mobility between two sectors. This paper can consider the effect of change ߪത on labor mobility. 
The wage rate of the final goods sector rises as shown by the wage rate (23) if ߪത rises. Then, there 
exists a positive effect on the labor supply in the final goods sector. As another form of training cost, 
ݓ௧ߪ௧ can be considered. Then, an increase in the wage rate raises the training cost. This paper assumes 
the same training costs as those posited by Caselli (1999). 
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ݓ௧௖ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ߪ௧,  Indifferent (12c) 
Therefore, with small ߪ௧, individuals work in the final goods sector because the utility 
in the case in which that they work in final goods sector is greater than the case in which 
they work in the elderly care sector. Otherwise, they work in the elderly care sector. 
If individuals work in final goods sector, then the following allocations are obtained 
because of ݓഥ௧ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ߪ௧, (4)–(6): 
ܿଵ௧ ൌ ߙߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ሺݓ௧ െ ߪ௧ሻ, (13)
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ݌
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ሺݓ௧ െ ߪ௧ሻ, (14)
݁ଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݖ௧ାଵ
݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ሺݓ௧ െ ߪ௧ሻ. (15)
If the individuals work in the elderly care sector, then the following allocations are 
obtained because of ݓഥ௧ ൌ ݓ௧௖, (4)–(6): 
ܿଵ௧ ൌ ߙߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻݓ௧
௖, (16)
ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ݌
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ݓ௧
௖, (17)
݁ଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݖ௧ାଵ
݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ݓ௧
௖. (18)
The amounts of labor supplied to the final goods sector and in the elderly care sector 
are given respectively as follows.4 
ܮ௧ ൌ ఙ೟
∗
ఙഥ , Labor supply in final goods sector (19)
ܮ௧௖ ൌ ఙഥିఙ೟
∗
ఙഥ , Labor supply in the elderly care sector (20)
Considering the market clearing condition of the elderly care sector at the ݐ ൅ 1 
period, the price of elderly care service is shown as 
                                                  
4 ఙ೟∗ఙഥ  and 
ఙഥିఙ೟∗
ఙഥ  respectively denote the labor supply share of final goods sector and elderly care sector. 
Considering the unity of population size, the labor supply share is the same as the labor supply level. 
An increase in ߪ௧∗ raises the labor share of final goods sector and reduces the labor share of the elderly 
care sector. 
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ߩ ߪത െ ߪ௧ାଵ
∗
ߪത ൌ ݌
ܴ௧ାଵ
ݖ௧ାଵ
݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቆන ሺݓݐ െ ߪݐሻ
1
ߪത ݀ߪ ൅ න ݓܿݐ
1
ߪത ݀ߪ
ߪത
ߪݐ∗
ߪݐ∗
0
ቇ. (21)
ߪ௧∗ is given as 
ߪ௧∗ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ݓ௧௖ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ߩݖ௧. (22)
Then, the wage rate (8) and interest rate (9) are given as 
ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܭ௧ఏ ൬ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
ିఏ
, (23)
1 ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ߠܭ௧ఏିଵ ൬ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
ଵିఏ
. (24)
The equilibrium of capital market is given as ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ׬ ݏ௧ఙഥ଴ ଵఙഥ ݀ߪ: 
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቆන ሺݓ௧ െ ߪሻ
1
ߪത ݀ߪ ൅න ݓ௧
௖ 1
ߪത ݀ߪ
ఙഥ
ఙ೟∗
ఙ೟∗
଴
ቇ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቆݓ௧ െ ߪ௧∗ ൅
ߪ௧∗ଶ
2ߪത ቇ. (25)
In addition, (21) is reduced to 
ሺݓ௧ାଵ െ ߪ௧ାଵ∗ ሻ ൬1 െ ߪ௧ାଵ
∗
ߪത ൰ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܭ௧ାଵ. (26)
In addition, (26) holds for any ݐ period. Therefore, the dynamics in this paper is specified 
by the capital stock ܭ௧ . Given ܭ௧,	 the equilibrium ܭ௧ାଵ, ݖ௧, ߪ௧∗, ݓ௧, 1 ൅ ݎ௧  are given 
respectively by (22)–(26). The equilibrium in the steady state is shown as 
ܭ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻቌሺ1 െ ߠሻܭ
ఏ ൬ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
ିఏ
െ ߪ∗ ൅ ߪ
∗ଶ
2ߪതቍ, (27)
ሺ1 െ ߠሻܭఏ ൬ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
ିఏ
൬1 െ ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰ െ ߪ
∗ ൅ ߪ
∗ଶ
ߪത ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߠܭ
ఏ ൬ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
ଵିఏ
. (28)
Variables in the steady state ܭ, ߪ∗ are obtained. The price of elderly care ݖ, wage rate 
ݓ, and an interest rate 1 ൅ ݎ are given respectively as (22)–(24). 
The wage rate (23) can be shown by another equation. Because of constant returns to 
scale of the production function of the final goods sector, ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ఏଵିఏ ݓ௧ାଵܮ௧ାଵ is 
obtainable. Substituting this equation into (26), (26) changes to the following equation. 
ݓ௧
ߪ௧∗ ൌ
1 െ ߪ௧∗ߪത
1 െ ൬1 ൅ ߠሺ1 െ ߚሻ1 െ ߠ ൰
ߪ௧∗ߪത
. (29)
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   Because of positive wage rate ݓ௧, the following inequality must hold. 
ߪ௧∗
ߪത ൏
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߠ. (30)
 
 4. Aging Society 
This section presents an assessment of how an increase in the number of elderly people 
deriving from an increase in life expectancy affects the elderly care service market. 
By total differentiation of (27) with respect to ܭ, ߪ∗, ݌ , the following equation is 
obtained as 
ሺ1 െ ܣሻ݀ܭ݀݌ െ ܤ
݀ߪ∗
݀݌ ൌ
ߙܭ
൫ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯݌, (31)
where 
ܣ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
߲ݓ
߲ܭ ൐ 0,  
ܤ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൬
߲ݓ
߲ߪ∗ െ
ߪത െ ߪ∗
ߪത ൰ ൏ 0.  
By total differentiation of (28) with respect to ܭ, ߪ∗, we obtain 
ܥ ݀ܭ݀݌ െ ܦ
݀ߪ∗
݀݌ ൌ 0, (32)
where5 
ܥ ൌ ൬1 െ ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
߲ݓ
߲ܭ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߠሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ,  
ܦ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻߠݓߪത െ
߲ݓ
߲ߪ∗ ൬1 െ
ߪ∗
ߪത ൰ ൅ 1 ൅
ݓ
ߪത െ
2ߪ∗
ߪത ൐ 0.  
Therefore, the comparative static analyses reveal that 
ቀ1 െ ܣ െܤܥ െܦቁ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
݀ܭ
݀݌
݀ߪ∗
݀݌ ی
ۋ
ۊ ൌ ቌ
ߙܭ
൫ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯݌
0
ቍ.  
                                                  
5 ܦ is positive because డ௪డఙ∗ ൏ 0 and 1 ൅
௪
ఙഥ െ
ଶఙ∗
ఙഥ ൌ 1 െ
ఙ∗
ఙഥ ൅
௪ିఙ∗
ఙഥ ൐ 0. 
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ௗఙ∗
ௗ௣  is shown as 
݀ߪ∗
݀݌ ൌ െ
ߙܭܥ
ܦ ቀܣ ൅ ܤܥܦ െ 1ቁ ൫ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯݌
. (33)
The sign of the denominator of (33) is negative.6 Therefore, if ܥ ൐ 0, then the sign of 
ௗఙ∗
ௗ௣  is positive in this model. However, ܥ ൐ 0 is obtained because (30) can always hold. 
An increase in life expectancy raises the capital stock because 
݀ܭ
݀݌ ൌ െ
ߙܭ
ቀܣ ൅ ܤܥܦ െ 1ቁ ൫ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ൯݌
൐ 0. (34)
An increase in capital stock increases the wage rate in final goods market given by 
(23) because the marginal productivity of labor in final goods market increases for given 
ߪ∗. However, increased life expectancy raises demand for elderly care services. The wage 
rate of elderly care sector rises. Labor mobility occurs from the final goods sector to the 
elderly care service. This mobility is shown as the following figure. 
 
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.] 
 
However, the case of Fig. 3 is excluded because of the inequality (30). Therefore, in 
this paper, only the case of Fig. 4 can be shown.7 
 
[Insert Fig. 4 around here.] 
 
An increase in life expectancy raises the labor productivity of the final goods sector 
because of an increase in capital stock. Then, the wage rate of the final goods sector rises. 
Labor mobility from the elderly care sector to the final goods sector might occur. 
An aging society does not always raise the share of labor dedicated to the elderly care 
sector. The following proposition can be established as shown by the proof above. 
 
                                                  
6 Because of the local stability condition, the sign of the denominator is negative. See the Appendix 
for a detailed proof of the local stability condition. 
7 The demand curve and supply curve in Figs. 3 and 4 are not linear. However, this paper depicts the 
linearization at the approximation of the equilibrium. 
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 Proposition 1 
An increase in life expectancy increases the capital stock and decreases the labor share 
of the elderly care services sector. 
 
This proposition shows that even if the wage rate in the elderly care services sector 
rises by virtue of an increase in demand for elderly care services because of an aging 
society, the labor supply does not always increase because the relative wage of the elderly 
care services sector to the final goods sector remains low. An increase in life expectancy 
raises household savings because the individual can live a long period and the savings 
for consumption during the old period is needed. An increase in savings raises the capital 
stock and therefore the labor demand for final goods and services. Then, the relative 
wage rate of the elderly care sector can remain low; the labor supply for elderly care 
services might not increase.8 This result is obtained in this model of a closed economy: 
an increase in life expectancy raises household savings. With a small open economy with 
an interest rate and wage rate in the final goods sector, an increase in life expectancy 
always raises the labor share for the elderly care services sector. 
Aisa and Pueyo (2013) set the closed economy considering capital accumulation and 
derive that the effect of an aging society on the labor supply to elderly care service is 
ambiguous because of the effect of capital accumulation. However, this paper can derive 
the negative effect of an aging society on the labor supply to elderly care service in the 
model of wage inequality, which is not considered by Aisa and Pueyo (2013).9 
This paper can examine wage inequality between the final goods sector and the 
elderly care services sector, as shown below. 
ݓ
ݓ௖ ൌ
ݓ
ݓ െ ߪ∗ ൌ
1
1 െ ߪ∗ݓ
, (35)
                                                  
8 An aging society raises capital accumulation. Then the labor share of final goods sector rises. However, 
the labor share of elderly care service sector decreases. No labor supply occurs in the elderly care sector. 
Regarding the demand for elderly care service, the positive labor supply in the elderly care sector exists 
even if the price of the elderly care service is very high. 
9 A large open economy is considered between a small open economy and a closed economy. Then, the 
effect derived by a closed economy can be nonexistent in a large open economy. The effect of an increase 
in the survival rate does not always reduce the labor supplied to the elderly care sector. 
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Because of ௗ
ೢ
഑∗
ௗఙ∗ ൌ
ഇሺభషഁሻ
భషഇ
ఙഥቀଵିቀଵାഇሺభషഁሻభషഇ ቁ
഑∗
഑ഥ ቁ
మ ൐ 0, an increase in ߪ∗ reduces ఙ
∗
௪  . Then, the wage 
inequality ௪௪೎ decreases. Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
 Proposition 2 
An increase in life expectancy reduces the wage inequality ௪௪೎. 
 
This proposition shows that an increase in life expectancy has the effect of both a 
decrease in labor share of elderly care service and an increase in relative wage rate of 
the elderly care sector. As shown in Fig. 4.b, we confirm that the wage rate of the elderly 
care sector rises. Then, the price of elderly care service rises too because of (11). 
I would like to compare the results presented in this paper with those presented by 
Caselli (1999), who considers an increase in the technological parameter, with workers 
moving from the old technology sector to new technology sector and wage rate of new 
technology sector rises. As described in this paper, an increase in ݌ plays the role of an 
increase in technology parameters in Caselli (1999). However, an increase in ݌ affects 
both sectors. In the final goods sector, an increase in ݌ raises capital accumulation. Also, 
the wage rate of the final goods sector rises. An increase in ݌ raises the demand for 
elderly care services and the wage rate of elderly care services. However, the former 
effect is larger than the latter effect. Therefore, an increase in ݌ has the effect of an 
increase in technology parameter in the analysis presented by Caselli (1999). 
 
5. Subsidy for Elderly Care Sector 
This section presents an examination of how subsidies for elderly care sector affect the 
labor share of the elderly care sector. The government collects tax revenues and provides 
subsidies for elderly care services. The tax is levied as lump-sum taxation ௧ܶ; the subsidy 
rate is given as ߝ (0 ൏ ߝ ൏ 1). The budget constraints are shown below. 
ݓഥ௧ െ ௧ܶ ൌ ܿଵ௧ ൅ ݏ௧, (36)
ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൌ ܿଶ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߝሻݖ௧ାଵ݁௧ାଵ, (37)
In the steady state equilibrium, (25) and (26) can be changed as 
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ܭ ൌ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቆݓ െ ߪ
∗ ൅ ߪ
∗ଶ
2ߪത െ ܶቇ, (38)
ሺ1 െ ߝሻሺݓ െ ߪ∗ሻሺߪത െ ߪ∗ሻ
ߪത ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻܭ. (39)
The government budget constraint in the steady state is given as 
ܶ ൌ ߝ݌ݖ݁. (40)
Therefore, the comparative statics at the approximation of ߝ ൌ 0 is derived as 
ቀ1 െ ܣ െܤܥ െܦቁ൮
݀ܭ
݀ߝ
݀ߪ∗
݀ߝ
൲ ൌ
ۉ
ۇെ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݌
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
݀ܶ
݀ߝ
ሺݓ െ ߪ∗ሻ ൬1 െ ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰ی
ۊ.  
Then, ௗఙ
∗
ௗఌ  are derived as 
݀ߪ∗
݀ߝ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ܣሻሺݓ െ ߪ∗ሻ ቀ1 െ ߪ∗ߪത ቁ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݌
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
݀ܶ
݀ߝ ܥ
ܦ ቀܣ ൅ ܤܥܦ െ 1ቁ
. (41)
The sign of (41) is ambiguous. The sign of ௗ௄ௗఌ  is ambiguous because  
݀ܭ
݀ߝ ൌ
ሺݓ െ ߪ∗ሻ ቀ1 െ ߪ∗ߪത ቁܤ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݌
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
݀ܶ
݀ߝ ܦ
ܦ ቀܣ ൅ ܤܥܦ െ 1ቁ
. (42)
This result is intuitive. The subsidy for elderly care services, which is a transfer from 
younger people to older people, can be regarded as a pay-as-you-go transfer. An increase 
in the lump-sum tax reduces savings because the household disposable income decreases. 
However, an increase in the subsidy raises demand for elderly care services and raises 
the wage rate of elderly care services, which raises household disposable income. 
The subsidy for elderly care services requires tax revenues. Even if the subsidy raises 
demand for elderly care services directly, the lump-sum tax reduces the demand 
indirectly. As long as the effect of the latter is greater than that of the former, the demand 
for elderly care services decreases; the price and wage rate for elderly care services 
decreases. Finally, the labor share in the elderly care service decreases. Therefore, the 
effects of the subsidy include ambiguous effects on the share of labor working for elderly 
care services and the wage inequality. 
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6. Numerical Examples 
This section presents examination of the effect of an aging society and the subsidy for 
elderly care on the labor market with numerical examples. This paper sets the parameter 
as follows.10 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here.] 
 
In this section, the product function (7) is defined as ௧ܻ ൌ ܣܭ௧ఏܮ௧ଵିఏ. Then, the dynamics 
of ܭ௧ is depicted as the following figure. As shown by Fig. 5, the dynamics of this model 
is locally stable. 
 
[Insert Fig. 5 around here.] 
 
6.1 Steady State 
Based on the parameter setting that is consistent with the realistic economic situation, 
this paper presents examination of the change of parameters ݌, ߚ and ߝ. The result is 
shown in the following table. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here.] 
 
Table 2 presents the result obtained in each case at the steady state. Case 1 is the 
basic case. Case 2 shows the case in which the survival rate increases and the ratio of 
older people to total population increases. Then, the labor share of final goods sector ߪ∗ 
increases. The wage inequality between final goods sector and elderly care sector ௪௪೎ 
decreases. This result demonstrates that an aging society promotes capital accumulation 
and the wage rate of final goods sector increases. Then, the labor supply moves from the 
elderly care sector to the final goods sector. However, the wage rate of the elderly care 
                                                  
10 Data for the parameter settings are presented in the Appendix. 
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sector rises because of a decrease in labor supply in the elderly care sector. Therefore, 
thanks to this effect, the wage inequality ௪௪೎ reduces. 
Case 3 shows the case in which that the preference parameter for elderly care service 
increases. Compared with Case 1, the labor share of elderly care sector increases; wage 
inequality ௪௪೎ decreases. An increase in demand for elderly care services raises the wage 
for elderly care services. The labor supply moves from the final goods sector to the elderly 
care sector. 
Case 4 shows the subsidy for elderly care service. Compared with Case 1, the labor 
share of elderly care service increases and wage inequality reduces. The utility level of 
the final goods sector worker that has average education cost ఙ
∗
ଶ  and elderly care service 
sector workers are defined respectively as ܷሺܨሻ and ܷሺܧሻ. By virtue of the subsidy for 
elderly care services, both ܷሺܨሻ and ܷሺܧሻ increase. The subsidy for elderly care service 
raises the utility levels of workers of both types. 
However, as shown by Case 5, if the preference parameter of the elderly care is large, 
the subsidy for elderly care services can raise only the utility of elderly care workers. 
The results and the data demand some explanation. As shown by Fig. 1, the elderly 
care workers are positively correlated with the elderly people share. However, Prop 1 
shows a negative correlation between the elderly care workers and the elderly people 
share: an increase in the elderly people share reduces the elderly care workers purely. 
As shown by the numerical examples in Case 4, the true factor of the positive correlation 
is the subsidy for elderly care services. Elderly care insurance in Japan started in 2000. 
After starting the subsidy for elderly care service, one can check the positive correlation. 
In addition, one must explain the wage inequality between two sectors ௪௪೎. Prop 2 
shows that an aging society reduces wage inequality ௪௪೎ as a pure effect. In Japan, the 
wage rate of the elderly care sector has increased in recent years. In fact, the low wage 
rate poses severe difficulties. The government has raised subsidies for the wage rate of 
the elderly care sector. Case 4 presents the case. Results presented in this paper are 
consistent with the real data. 
 
6.2 Transitional Path 
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This paper presents examination of the transitional path of the effect of an aging society 
and the subsidy for the elderly care service. Effects on the labor share and the wage 
inequality between the final goods sector and the elderly care sector are shown by the 
following figures. 
 
[Insert Fig. 6 around here.] 
 
Fig. 6.a presents the case in which ݌ increases by 10%. That is, ݌ changes 0.9 to 0.99. 
Period -1 shows the steady state before changing ݌. During the 0 period, the shock occurs. 
An increase in ݌ increases the wage inequality and decreases the labor supply of elderly 
care service. However, capital accumulation effects weaken the positive effect on the 
wage inequality and the negative effect on the labor supply of elderly care services. An 
increase in capital accumulation raises the wage rate of the final goods sector and the 
demand for elderly care service increases. By virtue of an increase in the demand for 
elderly care services, the wages of the elderly care sector increase. 
Fig. 6.b shows the case in which ߝ changes from 0 to 0.1. Subsidies raise the labor 
supply of elderly care services and reduce wage inequality. Because of decreased capital 
accumulation, demand for elderly care services decreases; the wage rate of elderly care 
sector decreases. Consequently, wage inequality is magnified. 
 
 7. Conclusions 
This paper presents an examination of how an aging society affects the labor market of 
the elderly care services sector. An aging society raises demand for elderly care services. 
Then, the share of labor dedicated to elderly care services sector increases. However, an 
aging society brings with it savings by which households can subsist for a longer time. 
Those savings are necessary for consumption. Therefore, an aging society raises the wage 
rate of the final goods sector because of the capital accumulation. Then, the labor supply 
is small in the elderly care services sector. 
This paper presents an examination of wage inequality between the elderly care 
services sector and the final goods sector. Results show that the relative wage rate of the 
17 
 
elderly care services sector increases. Moreover, this paper presents an examination of 
subsidy effects on the elderly care services market. Results of the numerical example 
show that the subsidy raises the labor supplied to the elderly care services sector and 
shrink the wage inequality between final goods sector and the elderly care service sector. 
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Appendix 
Local Stability Condition 
Total differentiation of (25) with respect to ܭ௧ାଵ, ܭ௧, ߪ௧∗ gives 
݀ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ݌
ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ߙ ൅ ݌ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቆ
߲ݓ
߲ܭ ݀ܭ௧ ൅ ቆ
߲ݓ
߲ߪ௧∗ െ
ߪത െ ߪ௧∗
ߪത ቇ ݀ߪ௧
∗ቇ. (A.1)
Considering ఈା௣ሺଵିఈሻ௣ሺଵିఈሻ ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ׬ ሺݓ௧ െ ߪሻ
ଵ
ఙഥ ݀ߪ ൅ ׬ ݓ௧௖
ଵ
ఙഥ ݀ߪ
ఙഥ
ఙ೟∗
ఙ೟∗
଴  and (21), (26) is obtained. 
From total differentiation of (26) with respect to ܭ௧, ߪ௧∗, the following equation is obtained. 
൭൬1 െ ߪ
∗
ߪത ൰
߲ݓ
߲ܭ െ ߚߠሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൱݀ܭ௧ ൌ ቆ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻߠݓ
ߪത െ
߲ݓ
߲ߪ∗ ൬1 െ
ߪ∗
ߪത ൰ ൅ 1 ൅
ݓ
ߪത െ
2ߪ∗
ߪത ቇ݀ߪ௧
∗. (A.2)
Then, ௗ௄೟శభௗ௄೟  are derived as shown below. 
݀ܭ௧ାଵ
݀ܭ௧ ൌ ܣ ൅
ܤܥ
ܦ . (A.3)
െ1 ൏ ܣ ൅ ஻஼஽ ൏ 1 is needed because of the local stability condition. 
 
Parameter Setting 
The discount factor of the consumption for quarter period is regarded as 0.99 in the 
literature of real business cycle theory (de la Croix and Doepke (2003)). Considering one 
period in the overlapping generations model as 30 years, 0.99ଵଶ଴ is about 0.3. Then, α ൌ
0.7 is set. 
This paper sets ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൌ 0.25, that is, ߚ ൌ ଴.ଶହଵି଴.଻ ൌ 0.83. The preference parameter 
for elderly care is given as ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൌ 0.05. The data of Statistics Japan “System 
of National Accounts” shows the household total expenditure and the expenditure for 
elderly care and medical care. The share of this expenditure to total expenditure is 4% 
at 2015. 
As shown by the data of Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan “Simple Life 
Table,” the survival rate that zero-year-old people can survive to 60 years old is about 
0.9. Then, ݌ ൌ 0.9 is set. 
In the most recent 30 years, the interest rate in Japan has been approximately 2%. 
ܣ ൌ 3.64 and ߪത ൌ 1 are set to hold the interest rate at 1 ൅ ݎ ൌ 1.8, as calculated using 
1.02ଷ଴. 
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ߩ is set as unity. The capital income share ߠ is set as 0.3. 
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Fig. 1: Elderly Care Workers and Elderly People’s Share of the Population. 
(Data: Population Statistics, National Institution of Population and Social Security 
Research, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan) 
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Fig. 2: Salaries of Elderly Care Workers (Thousand yen per month). 
(Data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan) 
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a) Labor market of final goods sector 
Fig. 3a: Aging society and the labor market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Labor market of elderly care services sector 
Fig. 3b: Aging society and the labor market. 
 
σ 
w 
Labor Demand (23) 
Labor Supply ߪ௧ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ݓ௧௖ 
σ 
w 
Labor Demand (21) 
Labor Supply ఙഥିఙ
∗
ఙഥ  
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Labor market of final goods sector 
Fig. 4a: Aging society and the labor market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Labor market of elderly care services sector 
Fig. 4b: Aging society and the labor market. 
 
σ 
w 
Labor Demand (23) 
Labor Supply ߪ௧ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ݓ௧௖ 
σ 
w௖ 
Labor Demand (21) 
Labor Supply ఙഥିఙ
∗
ఙഥ  
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݌ 0.9 
α 0.7 
β 0.83 
ߪത 1 
ߠ 0.3 
ܣ 3.64 
ߩ 1 
 
Table 1: Parameter Setting 
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Fig. 5: Dynamics of ܭ௧.  
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p α (1-α)β ε K σ* w 1+r w/w c U(F) U(E)
① 0.9 0.7 0.25 0 0.4348 0.8883 2.0557 1.8 1.7609 -0.0522 -0.3649
② 1 0.7 0.25 0 0.4909 0.8907 2.1302 1.6566 1.7185 -0.0837 -0.3906
③ 0.9 0.7 0.2 0 0.4653 0.8133 2.1542 1.6138 1.6066 -0.0728 -0.3297
④ 0.9 0.7 0.25 0.1 0.4325 0.8784 2.0594 1.7925 1.7438 -0.0517 -0.3613
⑤ 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4607 0.7988 2.1595 1.6047 1.5870 -0.0729 -0.3266  
Table 2: Effects of an Aging Society and Elderly Care Subsidy 
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Fig. 6.a: Transition Path for Increased Life Expectancy. 
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Fig. 6.b: Transition Path in an Increase in Subsidy for Elderly Care Service. 
 
 
